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Mind, Metaphor, Law
by Mark L. Johnson*
Change, as John Dewey observed, is a basic fact of human experience.
We are temporal creatures, and the situations we find ourselves in, the
situations that make up the fabric of our lives, are always evolving and
developing. The omnipresence of change throughout all human
experience thus creates a fundamental problem for law, namely, how can
law preserve its integrity over time, while managing to address the
newly emerging circumstances that continually arise throughout our
history? If, following one extreme, we think of law as fixed, static, and
univocal in its content, then law runs the risk of losing its relevance to
the new conditions and problems that face us each day. However, the
opposite extreme-that law is completely malleable-is equally
untenable, for that would make law nothing more than a tool of those in
power. Our problem, therefore, is how law can be both stable and
capable of growth.
I believe that part of the answer to this foundational question is
beginning to emerge from recent research in the cognitive sciences.
Human law is a many-splendored creation of the human mind, that is,
of human understanding and reasoning. The primary business of the
cognitive sciences is to study empirically how the mind works.
Therefore, cognitive science ought to give us insight into the nature of
legal concepts and legal reasoning.'
Even though the "cognitive science of law" is a very recent development, its potential for transforming legal theory is substantial.
However, most people do not believe that the cognitive sciences are
theoretically rich enough, and sufficiently non-reductionist in character,
to do justice to the depths of legal understanding. This prejudice is
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1. For the most thorough treatment to date of the implications of cognitive science for
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based, I suspect, on the fact that people tend only to know about what
I call "first-generation" cognitive science, which grew out of work in the
1950s in computer science and artificial intelligence and assumed views
of meaning and thought that came straight out of early information
processing psychology, analytic philosophy of mind and language, and
generative linguistics. I have to admit that this type of cognitive theory
has almost nothing to tell us about the nature of law because it has
turned out to tell us very little about how the mind actually works.
I. THE NEED FOR A COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF LAW
Happily, things have changed dramatically over the past two decades
in light of the emergence of a second generation of cognitive science,
which has called into question virtually all of the major assumptions of
the first-generation paradigm.2 Instead of seeing the mind as a
disembodied computer program, the newer research reveals that our
conceptualization and reasoning are grounded in our bodily experience
and shaped primarily by patterns of perception and action.' There is a
logic of our bodily experience that is imaginatively appropriated in
defining our abstract concepts and reasoning with them. Imaginative
processes of this sort depend on the nature of our bodies, our brains, and
the patterns of our interactions with our environment. Imagination-which is the soul of human thinking-is therefore constrained and
orderly, even though it can be flexible and creative in response to novel
situations.4
This new cognitive science of the embodied mind is predicated on the
assumption that there is no human conceptualization or reasoning
without a functioning human brain, which operates a living human body
that is continually engaging environments that are at once physical,
social, cultural, economic, moral, legal, gendered, and racialized. Our
embodiment shapes both what and how we experience, think, mean,
imagine, reason, and communicate. This claim is a bold one, and it
directly challenges our received folk wisdom that what we call "mind"
and "body" are somehow two fundamentally different kinds of entities.
From a philosophical point of view, one of the hardest tasks you'll ever
face is coming to grips with the fact of your embodiment because this
fact requires a serious rethinking of the nature of mind, thought, and

2. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 77 (1999); FRANCISCO J.

VARELA, EVAN THOMPSON & ELEANOR ROSCH, THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNrrrvE SCIENCE
AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE (1991).

3. LAKOFF &.JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 78.
4. See id. at 77-78.
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language. What makes this task so very difficult is the omnipresent
idea of disembodied mind and thought that leaves its traces everywhere
we turn, from claims about pure logical form, to pure concepts, to ideas
of non-corporeal thought, to spectator views of knowledge, to correspondence theories of truth.
What is at stake here? Why should any of this matter? My answer
is this:
1. A disembodied view of mind is often used to support a
literalist and objectivist view of thought, concepts, and reason.
2. On the objectivist view, concepts are believed to have strict,
fixed boundaries defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.
This is what George Lakoff calls the "classical theory" of categories,
according to which any concept is allegedly demarcated by a
particular unique set of features that jointly identify some entity as
falling under a specific concept.5
3. An objectivist/literalist paradigm supports a view of moral
and legal reasoning as the application of literally-defined objective
categories to situations in an all-or-nothing fashion, based on fixed
criteria.
4. This objectivist/literalist theory is based on an empirically
false view of cognition, mind, and language. It presupposes a
dangerously false view of what a person is and how the mind works.
5. As a result, empirical research on the nature of cognition
should have important implications for our understanding of moral
and legal concepts and reasoning.
II.

WHERE DOES MEANING COME FROM?

If you think, as I do, that there is no mind without a body-a body in
continuous interaction with ever-changing environments-then you've
got to explain how this bodily activity gives rise to all our glorious
abstract thoughts and symbolic interactions. I want to give a sketch of
my version of certain key parts of this massive story of embodied
meaning and thought and then suggest how this new view bears on our
understanding of legal reasoning.
Second generation cognitive science has been developing a bold new
theory of the bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason.6 Here,

5. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUs THINGs: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOuT THE MIND 6 (1987).
6. For summary accounts of second-generation cognitive science research on the
embodiment of mind, thought, and language, see supra note 2.
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I can focus only on three of the most important aspects of human
cognition that have potentially profound implications for law:
. Radially structured categories that manifest prototypicality
effects.
. Image schemas, as a basis for embodied meaning and logical
inference.
• Conceptual metaphors, by which we extend embodied meaning
into our abstract conceptualization and reasoning.
III.

RADIAL CATEGORIES AND PROTOTYPICALITY EFFECTS

The classical theory of categories, which is the default view held by
nearly everyone in our culture, is that categories have a fixed, stable,
and objective structure.7 In this view, a concept like "dog" is believed
to be defined by a set of features an object must possess to be that
particular type of thing we call a dog. If some object has those features,
then it is a dog, and not otherwise. Notice that assuming this view of
concepts leads us to a very specific view of moral and legal reasoning.
If a principle, rule, or law consists of a set of classically structured
concepts, then that law would apply in a certain clear fashion solely to
those situations where the defining conditions for the concepts were
satisfied in our experience. If "thou shalt not murder," and if you know
the necessary and sufficient conditions that define murder, then your
only problem in evaluating a proposed course of action is to determine
precisely whether it involves an act of murder. If a certain act manifests
the requisite properties that constitute murder, then it is prohibited,
period. This classical objectivist view of categories, if it were true, would
make law a neat little process of strict rule application. How a legal
concept might grow without completely redefining the concept, and how
legal judgment might change in a rational, stable manner, could never
be explained using this view. But at least a conservative view of law
would be upheld.
Contrary to the classical objectivist view, there is now a massive and
steadily growing body of empirical evidence supporting the proposition
that large parts of human conceptualization and reasoning do not work
in the way the classical theory requires.' What the evidence shows is
that many of our most basic concepts, from those for simple objects like
cups and beds, all the way to abstract concepts in morality, politics,

7. LAKOFF, supra note 5.
8. For a fairly comprehensive account of the relevant research up to 1987, see LAKOFF,
supra note 5.
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science, religion, and law, have complicated internal radial structures
and exhibit what are known as "prototypicality effects."9
To illustrate my point about this complex structure of concepts, I want
to tell an extremely sad story. Something awful happened this past
summer. You know what I'm referring to, right? I'm talking about the
planet Pluto, which-I can hardly utter the words-is now not a planet.
And I'm really upset with President George W Bush for not standing up
for Pluto. Our President is someone who claims to stand four-square
behind the idea that our most important concepts are literal and are
fixed in their essence-fixed by God, man, or both. He stood for this
principle, for example, when he insisted that marriage is a blessed union
between a man and a woman. He asserted that marriage has always
been that way and that this is clearly a manifestation of the essential
nature of marriage. But I ask you, where was our President when those
planetary activists decided to ignore the obvious essence of planethood
and brazenly declared Pluto kicked out of the planetary family? Well,
he was not there to defend conceptual objectivism. In fairness, I suppose
he did not regard it as his job to wade in on science (unless that science
is evolutionary science).
You thought Pluto was quite obviously a planet, right? Your whole
astronomical education was based on this. And now what are we
supposed to do with all those little solar system models we made with
Styrofoam balls?
What happened to Pluto? The answer goes something like this. The
concept of a planet has turned out to be just like nearly all of our other
concepts. That is, it is defined relative to our history, values, interests,
purposes, institutions, and philosophical views. The fact of what
constitutes a planet turns out to depend quite substantially on the
values certain people called astronomers hold dear. And smart people
differ greatly about what those foundational values are. Let me explain.
There are scads of small bodies circling the sun. Why do we call some
of them planets and others not? One reason is that they have a certain
size. Marble-sized bits of astrodust do not count. We could decide that
astrodust should count, but we appear to have good reasons (and good
values) for excluding it. In other words, astronomers have to decide just
what importance size should play in defining the notion of a planet. For
example, Pluto is apparently smaller than our moon. When Mike Brown
of California Institute of Technology discovered 2003 UB313 (dubbed
"Xena"), it looked like there was at least a 10th planet.10 Now, Xena

9. Id. at 40-41.
10. See Jerry Adler et al., Of Cosmic Proportions;Astronomersdecide Pluto isn't a real
planet anymore. Why they did it-andhow our view of the universe is changing,NEWSWEEK,
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is bigger than Pluto. Oh, no! What are we to do? Should we keep
adding planets of a certain size, as we find them?
The next criterion that came into play for some, but not all, astronomers was whether the planet lies within the orbital plane of the other
planets. It turns out, however, that Pluto's plane is slightly different
than the plane shared by the other planets. Is that enough reason to
boot it? Other astronomers propose other criteria, such as appropriate
shape. This is actually a question about the formation of the planet-it
has to be roughly spherical, which gives evidence that it was formed by
a certain sequence of geological processes. So, two-hundred mile long
slivers of rock do not count as planets. Some people even attribute
metaphysical import to the spherical shape of planets, claiming that the
sphere is the perfect shape in the great ontological scheme.
Okay, so maybe we can just say that planets are spheres that orbit the
sun and not another body. However, it appears that this does not quite
work for Pluto because it has a moon that is almost half its size, and it
is not really clear whether the moon circles Pluto or whether, like two
squirrels running around a tree trunk, they circle each other. It gets
worse. Some astronomers then decided that it would be useful to
stipulate that a true planet had to dominate its own orbit in a way that
it would clear out other objects in its orbit.
I trust that the point I am trying to make is clear enough by now. It
is starting to look as though our old, faithful idea of planets as balls of
rock orbiting the sun is not arbitrary but defined relative to the history
of our astronomy, our metaphysical systems, our observational technology, and a host of other facts and values. Those values and theoretical
commitments show themselves, I am suggesting, in the fact that to
answer the question-"Is Pluto a planet?"-- depends, at the very least,
on which of two competing orientations you choose: (1) the planetary
scientists who are interested mostly in the composition and geologic
processes of the celestial bodies or (2) the so-called "dynamicists" who
are more interested in their mass, orbit, and their clearing out of their
orbital plane. There is no absolute fact about what constitutes a planet.
Any facts about planets are likely to be dependent on various values and
theoretical commitments held by the people who get to decide the issue.
My point is that what we have just seen about the nature of planets
reveals some very important insights about the nature of human
conceptualization in general. Concepts can grow and change, but there
are, nonetheless, various kinds of constraints on that growth. Accordingly, this is clearly not an arbitrary process. This is why I get upset when

Sept. 4, 2006, at 44.
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people complain that our nation is under the sway of a bunch of liberal
legal activists. They are misrepresented as thinking that the law means
whatever judges say it means. And with what is the alleged activistlegislation-posing-as-judicial-judgments
contrasted?
The answer,
apparently, is that activist legislation is supposedly contrasted with
what the laws really mean when we understand the literal legal
concepts correctly.1'
I cannot understand either this original intent doctrine or its
attendant notion of literal and objectively defined legal concepts as
squaring with virtually any of the evidence I know of concerning how
human conceptualization and reasoning work. It looks to me, instead,
that most of our moral and legal concepts are more like the concept of
a planet than they are anything like classical categories. 2 Concepts
are ways we make distinctions and mark patterns. We do this for
various purposes and relative to the developing situations in which we
find ourselves. The proper application of concepts is an imaginative
activity through and through.
But concepts are even more complexly structured than this. Consider
the phenomenon known as "prototype effects" that was made famous by
the work of Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues." Rosch demonstrated
that, from a cognitive perspective, people often build their categories
around prototypical members, and they understand less-prototypical
members by virtue of their relations to the prototypes. 4 Rosch found,
for example, that in America prototypical birds include robins and
sparrows. Robins and sparrows establish cognitive reference points for
peoples' reasoning about birds. Less-prototypical birds, such as chickens,
emus, ostriches, roadrunners, and penguins are cognized as lying at
varying distances from the center of the category according to various
principles of extension. 5 In some cases, there may even turn out to be
no univocal set of classical defining features shared by all members of
the category. Yet, we do manage to reason quite effectively by virtue of

11. Typically, the "true" meaning of those legal concepts ends up being tied to the text
of the words at issue or, if those words are ambiguous, its "original intent" as understood
by the writers of the legislation.
12. I know this has been pointed out by others ad nauseum, but what does any notion
of original intent tell us about how the law should view in vitro fertilization, genetic
cloning, nuclear waste contamination, or any other newly emerging condition that the
founders could not have possibly even imagined?
13. Eleanor Rosch, CognitiveReference Points,7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 532-47 (1975);
see LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 39-40.
14. Rosch, supra note 13, at 544.
15. LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 44-45.
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our complex understanding of our radial categories and how they apply
to different situations.
This prototype characterization applies also to our most important
abstract concepts, and not just to those for concrete physical objects.
Take, for example, the category "harm-" At its conceptual center are
cases of direct physical injury to an organism, such that the organism
suffers some dysfunction, often accompanied by bodily pain. But via
principles of metaphorical extension, there are also cases of nonprototypical harm, such as emotional harm, psychological harm, social harm,
economic harm, ethical harm, legal harm, and so on. None of these is
necessarily more experientially basic than any other, but from the
viewpoint of how we cognize things, some are more central and
prototypical than others.
I am proposing that we should think of our ethical and legal concepts
as, for the most part, having complex radial structures, manifesting
prototype effects. Such concepts are motivated by and grounded in our
shared bodily, social, cultural, moral, economic, and legal experience.
But there are body-based principles of extension that allow us to apply
our concepts to novel cases and sometimes also to expand our concepts.
These principles of extension include image schema structure and
conceptual metaphor, which allow for cognitive flexibility in the face of
changing situations, even as they provide cognitive motivation and
constraint for how we think creatively. This is how embodied imaginative meaning and understanding can grow. This is how innovation is
possible and how it is constrained. So, we need to look at the role of
image schemas and metaphor.
LV.

IMAGE SCHEMAS

i6

Let us start with the fact that our experience is permeated with
hundreds of recurring sensory-motor patterns, known as "image
schemas," which give shape, connection, and significance to what we
experience. To illustrate
this kind of meaningful structure, consider the
"container" schema. 17
Thousands of times each day we perceive, manipulate, and interact
with containers, such as cups, boxes, briefcases, rooms, vehicles, and
even our own bodies. Via these recurrent vital interactions, we come to

16.

Selected parts of the following sections on images schemas and conceptual

metaphor are taken from chapter seven of my book, MARK JOHNSON, THE MEANING
BODY: AESTHETICS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (forthcoming).
17.

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 31-32.

OF THE
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learn the meaning and logic of containment.
consists of the following minimal structure:
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The container schema

1. A Boundary
2. An Interior
3. An Exterior'
To get schemas for concepts like "in" and "out," one must add structure
that profiles various parts of the container schema. 19 The concept "in"
profiles (highlights or activates) the interior of the container schema,
whereas the concept "out" profiles the exterior that surrounds the
boundary.2" "In" and "out" also require identification of a figure/ground
(or trajector/landmark) structure relative to the container schema.2
When we say, "The horse left the barn," the horse is the figure (trajector)
relative to the barn, which is the ground (or landmark).22
One crucial thing to notice is that, even for image schemas as
elementary and simple as the container schema, there is already a
definite spatial or bodily logic that is learned from our sensory-motor
experience and that constrains our inferences about containers:
1. If an object, X, is in container A, then that object is not
outside that container.
2. If an object, X, is within container A, and container A is
within container B, then object X is within container B.
3. If an object, X, is outside of container B, and container A is
inside container B, then object X is outside of container A.28
To emphasize just how much internal structure and thereby how much
constraint on spatial logics there can be for even our most elementary
image schemas, consider the "source-path-goal schema."24 One could
specify the minimal structure of the source-path-goal schema as follows:

18.

Id. at 32.

19. GEORGE LAKOFF & RAFAEL E. NVn&Ez, WHERE MATHEMATICS COMES FROM: How
THE EMBODIED MIND BRINGS MATHEMATICS INTO BEING 31 (2001).

20.
21.

Id.
Id.

22. See id.
23.
24.

Id.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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1. A source point from which the path begins.
2. A path leading in some direction.
3. A goal, that is, an endpoint for the path.25
Described in this minimal way, you might think that the image
schema does not have enough internal structure to support extensive
inferences. However, actual source-path-goal schemas typically have
considerable additional structure that can serve as the basis for a wide
range of inferences, for example:
A trajector that moves
A source location (the starting point)
A goal (the intended destination for the trajector)
A route from the source to the goal
The actual trajectory of motion
The position of the trajector at a given time
The direction of the trajector at that time
The actual final location of the trajector when the motion is
terminated,which may be different from the intended destination.2 6
This list leaves out other possible parameters that might play a role
in various events, including speed of motion of the trajector, the trail left
by the moving object, obstacles to motion, aids to motion, forces that
move the trajector, multiple trajectors, and so on.
An extremely important feature of image schemas is that they are
topological in the sense that they can undergo a wide range of distortions or transformations while still retaining their image-schematic
structure and logic.28 For example, a path can be straight, or it can
twist and turn back upon itself, or it can involve stop-and-go motion
without losing its characteristic source-path-goal structure and without
violating its characteristic spatial logic.29
Another crucial property of image schemas is their compositionality,
that is, their ability to combine to produce other image schemas3s Via
such composition, vast expanses of our experience and understanding of
our mundane bodily experience are structured image-schematically. For
example, as Lakoff and Niifiez have shown, the concepts "into" and "out

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See LAKOFF & NO1Ez, supra note 19, at 39.
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of' are blendings of the container schema with the source-path-goal
schema.3' The "into" schema is a composition of the "in" schema and
the "to" schema, whereas
the "out of"schema combines the "out" schema
32
and the "from" schema:
Into Schema
. The "in" schema: consisting of a container schema, with the
interior profiled and taken as landmark.
- The "to" schema: consisting of a source-path-goal schema, with
the goal profiled and taken as landmark.
. Correspondences: (Interior; Goal) and (Exterior; Source).
Out of Schema
. The "out" schema: consisting of a container schema, with the
exterior profiled and taken as landmark.
. The "from" schema: consisting of a source-path-goal schema,
with the source profiled and taken as landmark.
. Correspondences: (Interior; Source) and (Exterior; Goal)."3
A full accounting of the image-schematic structure of our experience
and understanding might extend to hundreds of structures. However,
most of these would be complex combinations of a smaller number of
more basic image schemas. In summary, there are four major points to
keep in mind concerning the nature and activation of image schemas:
1. Image schemas characterize the recurring structure of much
of our sensory-motor experience.
2. They are learned automatically through our bodily interactions with aspects of our environment, given the nature of our
brains and bodies in relation to the possibilities for experience that
are afforded us within different environments. Image schemas are
meaningful to us even when, as is typical, they operate beneath the
level of conscious awareness. (They are a basic part of embodied
meaning).
3. They have highly determinate "spatial" or "bodily" logics that
support and constrain inferences.
4. They are compositional in that they combine and blend,
yielding even more complex embodied meaning and inference
patterns.

31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. Id.
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When I say that meaning is grounded in the body, I mean that the
meaning of our experience emerges pre-reflectively from sensory
experience and patterns of our bodily orientation, perceptual interaction,
and movement. Image schemas constitute much of the inferential
structure of this embodied understanding. All of this is tied intimately
to the nature of our bodies and to the nature of the environments we
inhabit. The range of image schemas is thus wide, but it is highly
constrained and motivated by how our bodies are shaped. A full account
of image schematic structures would include not just containment and
source-path-goal, but a large array of schemas: attraction, repulsion,
compulsion, blockage, verticality, right-left symmetry, balance, scalar
intensity, straight versus curved, and so on.
V.

EMBODIMENT OF ABSTRACT THOUGHT

Anyone who is convinced by the evidence for the embodiment of mind
must then face the vexing problem of how abstract thought is tied to the
body. How do we get from our perceptual and motor understanding to
our most wonderful achievements of abstract conceptualization,
reasoning, and creativity? The general form of the answer appears to be
something like this: Neural structures central to sensory and motor
processing must be recruited to carry out the inferences that make up
our abstract patterns of thinking. Structures of "perceiving and doing"
must serve as structures of "thinking and knowing." Much recent work
in this area has come from the relatively new field of cognitive neuroscience in studies of the neural structures and processes that make it
possible for us to appropriate bodily meaning for abstract conceptualization and reasoning.' I will not address this highly technical literature.
Instead, I will try to describe these processes from the perspective of
cognitive psychology and linguistics. What we have found so far is that
one of the central devices for human abstraction is what we call
"conceptual metaphor," which involves a conceptual mapping from a
highly structured source domain, typically some sensory-motor domain,
to a less highly structured target domain, typically some abstract notion,
such as justice, freedom, or mind."5 Let me illustrate this with some
basic examples.

34. See George Lakoff, The Neural Theory of Metaphor, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (forthcoming).
35. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 45.
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VI.

CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS

It is not surprising that all our perceptual, spatial relations, and
bodily movement concepts are intimately tied to our embodiment. Still,
even though this may seem obvious to many people, it is nonetheless a
difficult task to explain just how this meaning arises and achieves
symbolic expression. Image schemas are but one key part of how this
happens. The most difficult problem facing any proponent of the
embodied mind hypothesis is to explain how abstract conceptualization
and reasoning are possible. How can we move from embodied meanings
tied to our sensory-motor experience all the way to abstract concepts like
love, justice, mind, knowledge, and freedom? How can we move from
embodied spatial logic and inferences all the way to abstract logical
relations and inferences?
There is no simple answer to these questions, but I believe that the
general answer is that various imaginative structures and processes
allow us to extend embodied meaning and thought to the highest level
of abstraction possible for us, all the way up to science, philosophy,
mathematics, logic, and law. Let us begin with a simple but suggestive
example of how this works. Recall my earlier description of the
structure and logic of the container schema. There is a commonplace
metaphor--"categories are containers7-that is pervasive in our
conceptual system and has its grounding in embodied container logic. 6
The conceptual metaphor "categories are containers" consists of a
systematic mapping of entities and relations from the domain of spatial
containment onto our understanding of conceptual categorization, as
follows:
The Categories Are Containers Metaphor
Source Domain

Target Domain

Containers

Categories

Bounded regions in space
Objects inside bounded regions
One bounded region inside another

36.
37.

LAKOFF & Nt1&z, supra note 19, at 43.
Id.

>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>

Categories
Category members
Subcategory 37

858

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

Via this conceptual mapping, we can understand categorization as
metaphorical placement within a container. For example, a certain
animal can fall within one species but outside of another. We can
identify an object as being in the category of living things. A subcategory is part of or is contained in a larger category. There can be several
subcategories within one more general category. Developing scientific
research can move one organism from the plant category into the animal
category.
Based on the source-to-target mapping, the spatial logic of containment that we mentioned above can carry directly over into the logic of
abstract categories.' This gives rise to a series of correspondences of
the following sort:
. "Every object is either within a container or outside of it"
(Source Domain inference) yields "Every entity is either within a
category C or outside of it" (Target Domain inference) = the Law of
the Excluded Middle.
- "Given two containers A and B and an object X, if container
A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B" (Source Domain inference)
yields "Given two categories A and B and an entity X, if A is in B,
and X is in A, then X is in B" (Target Domain inference) = Modus
Ponens.
. "Given three containers (A, B, C), if A is in B and B is in C,
then A is in C" (Source Domain inference) yields "Given three
categories (A, B, C), if A is in B and B is in C, then category A is in
C" (Target Domain inference) = the Hypothetical Syllogism.
. "Given two containers A and B and an object Y, if A is in B
and Y is outside B, then Y is outside A" (Source Domain inference)
yields "Given two categories A and B and an entity Y, if A is in B
and Y is outside of B, then Y is outside of A" (Target Domain
inference) = Modus Thllens.39
Notice that it is precisely this metaphorical container logic that is
appropriated by the objectivist view of legal reasoning that I mentioned
earlier.
What this metaphorical logic of containment illustrates is the general
principle that there are metaphorical and other imaginative structures
that make it possible for us to understand abstract concepts and to
reason about them using the spatial logics of various body-based source
domains. For example, when we hear someone say, "Penguins fall

38. Id. at 44.
39. Id.
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outside the category of birds," in the context of talking about birds,
"outside" activates the source-to-target mapping of the conceptual
metaphor "categories are containers," and we thereby enlist the logic of
containers as we process the next utterances of the speaker.
One of the most pressing questions raised by the existence of
conceptual metaphors is why we have the ones we do and how we
acquire them. In Metaphors We Live By,"° where Lakoff and I first
described conceptual metaphors of this sort, we did not have satisfactory
answers to such questions about grounding." However, over the past
two decades, a substantial and growing body of empirical research has
shed increasing light on the experiential grounding issue.
Recently, Joe Grady has proposed a theory of "primary metaphors"
that offers a way of explaining how more complex systems of conceptual
metaphors arise from and are built out of more primitive body-based
metaphors.4 2 Grady's work drew on Chris Johnson's study of metaphor
acquisition in young children." Johnson hypothesized that young
children go through a "conflation stage" in which certain subjective
experiences and judgments are conflated with, and therefore are not
differentiated from, certain sensory-motor experiences." For instance,
an infant that is being held in its mother's arms will simultaneously
experience affection and warmth.4 5 During this conflation period, the
young child will automatically acquire a large number of associations
between these two different domains of affection and warmth, since they
are co-active domains." Later, the child enters a "differentiation stage"
in which she can conceptually distinguish the different domains, even
though they remain co-activated and associated.4 7 These cross-domain
associations are the basis of mappings that define a large number of
primary metaphors, such as AFFECTION IS WARMTH. 48 The AFFECTION

ISWARMTH metaphor underlies such expressions as "She received a 'cool'

40. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE By (1980).
41. Id. at 3-6.
42. Joseph Grady, Metaphor and Blending, in METAPHOR IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

101-24 (Gerard J. Steen & Raymond W. Gibbs, eds., 1999); see generally LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 49 (summarizing Grady's theory of primary metaphors).
43. Christopher Johnson, Metaphor vs. Conflation in the Acquisition of Polysemy: The
Case of See, in 152 CULTURAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TYPOLOGICAL ISSUES IN COGNITVE
LINGUISTICS: CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 155, 155-69 (M.K. Hiraga, C. Sinha,

and S. Wilcox, eds., 1997).

44. Id. at 155.
45. See id. at 159-60.
46. Id.
47.

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 48-49.

48. Id. at 49.
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reception from the committee," "He shot her an 'icy' glare," "She's
'warming' to me slowly," and "Relations have 'thawed' as we spend more
time together."
Grady has analyzed a large number of primary metaphors that result
from basic cross-domain correlations in our shared bodily experience.49
What follows are a few representative examples of primary metaphors,
along with their grounding and examples of linguistic manifestations of
the underlying mapping:
Affection Is Warmth
Subjective Judgment: Affection
Sensory-motor Domain: Temperature
Experiential Basis: Feeling warmth while being held affectionately.
Examples: "I received a warm reception in Norway." "Our relationship
has cooled off recently."
Intimacy Is Closeness
Subjective Judgment: Intimacy
Sensory-motor Domain: Physical closeness
Experiential Basis: Being physically close to people with whom you are
intimate.
Examples: "We've been close for years." "Now we seem to be drifting
apart."
Bad Is Stinky
Subjective Judgment: Evaluation
Sensory-motor Domain: Smell
Experiential Basis: Being repelled by foul-smelling objects and pleased
by good-smelling things.
Example: "This whole affair stinks!" "Something smells fishy with this
contract."
More Is Up
Subjective Judgment: Quantity increase or decrease
Sensory-motor Domain: Vertical orientation
Experiential Basis: Observing rise and fall of levels of piles and fluids
as more is added or taken away.
Examples: "Prices are sky-rocketing!" "The number of crimes rose
precipitously this year."

49. Id. at 49-54.
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Organization Is Physical Structure
Subjective Judgment: Abstract form or relationships
Sensory-motor Domain: Perceiving and manipulating physical objects
Experiential Basis: Interacting with physical objects and recognizing
their functional structure (correlation between observing part-whole
structures of physical objects and forming cognitive representations of
functional and logical relationships).
Examples: "The pieces of his theory don't fit together." "I can't see how
the premises are connected to the conclusion in your argument."
Purposes Are Destinations
Subjective Judgment: Achieving a purpose
Sensory-motor Domain: Reaching a destination
Experiential Basis: Correlation of reaching a destination and thereby
achieving a purpose.
Examples: "You've finally arrived, baby." "She's got a long way to go
to the completion of her graduate degree."
Knowing Is Seeing
Subjective Judgment: Knowledge
Sensory-motor Domain: Vision
Experiential Basis: Gaining knowledge through visual perception.
Examples: "I finally see the answer to our problem." "That's an obscure
part of your theory." °
The Johnson-Grady hypotheses together give us an account of how
mostly unconscious correlations in our experience could be the basis for
primary conceptual metaphors, which are then combined into complex
metaphors. Their views are consistent with neural models of the sort
developed by Srini Narayanan that can "learn" certain types of
metaphors. 5
Over the past decade Raymond Gibbs has carried out a number of
major experiments to test for the existence of conceptual metaphors in
our thinking and to probe the alleged bodily grounding of such metaphors.52 Gibbs's early work is powerfully summarized in his book, The

50. Id.
51. See Srini Narayanan, Talking the Talk is Like Walking the Walk: A Computational
Model of Verbal Aspect, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 548, 548-53 (Pat Langley & Michael G. Shafto, eds., 1997);
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 41-42, 49, 54-56.
52. See RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., THE POETICS OF MIND: FIGURATIvE THOUGHT,
LANGUAGE, AND UNDERSTANDING (1994).
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Poetics of Mind,5 3 and he has continued to explore various experimental
techniques to test various hypotheses concerning conceptual metaphor.
His most recent study focused on the bodily and experiential basis of
conceptual metaphors for desire that underlie expressions in English and
in Brazilian Portuguese."4 Consider the question of whether there
exists a conceptual metaphor DESIRE IS HUNGER. How could we show
this using psychological testing methods? In the following passage an
American college student describes her romantic attraction to a boy she
knew in high school:
Back in high school, I had this HUGE crush on this guy, James, who
was a total hunk. He would flirt with me when we'd talk, but I didn't
get a chance to know him very well, nevermind ever be alone with him.
I was dying to get closer to him, and felt starved for his attention. I
walked around for over five months feeling silly and empty because I
wanted him so bad. I wanted to eat him alive! He was yummy! 5
Is this embodied way of talking about her desire as hunger merely a
way of talking, or is it a conceptual metaphor grounded in her bodily
experience of hunger? In other words, is DESIRE IS HUNGER a primary

metaphor, or perhaps a metonymy, or is it just a propositional name for
a set of superficial linguistic expressions? An initial inspection of the
language of desire in English and Brazilian Portuguese revealed that the
concepts of hunger and thirst are used extensively in both languages to
talk about a broad range of abstract desires. For instance, we can
hunger or thirst for attention, promotion, righteousness, justice, power,
revenge, or equality. But what evidence could there be that this is more
than just talk-that it is conceptual and guides our reasoning?
What Gibbs and his colleagues did was first to determine how their
American and Brazilian subjects understood hunger, or in other words,
what their cognitive model of hunger was. For example, both cultures
associate hunger with local symptoms like a grumbling stomach, having
one's mouth water (salivating), and stomach ache, with general
symptoms, such as feeling discomfort, feeling weak, becoming dizzy, and
with behavior symptoms like feeling anxious and feeling out of balance.
Now, if such symptoms are strongly associated with hunger, and if they
thus form a shared cultural model of hunger that is intimately tied to
our shared bodily experiences, then this conceptualization should show

53. Id.
54. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Embodiment and Linguistic Meaning, 84 BRAIN AND
LANGUAGE 1 (2003).

55. Id. at 9.
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up in manifestations of the DESIRE IS HUNGER metaphor, assuming, of
course, that there really is such a conceptual mapping for us.
One way in which this hypothesis was tested was to formulate a
number of linguistic expressions in the two languages concerning lust,
love, and other desires. Some of these were constructed using the
knowledge of the idealized cognitive model of hunger that was elicited
in the earlier study.. The other expressions were made up of a range of
symptoms judged in the first study to be only weakly associated with
hunger or not associated at all. Expressions of the following sort were
used: "My whole body aches for you," "I have a strong headache for
knowledge," "My hands are itching for you," and "My knees ache for
information about my ancestry." Participants read such statements,
either in English or Portuguese, and were asked to rate how acceptable
each of these ways of talking would be in their culture. As one would
expect, if there actually exists a DESIRE IS HUNGER metaphor, then
subjects would rate the sentences with expressions tied to the local,
general, and behavior symptoms of hunger much higher (more appropriate) than those that conceptualized desire only with very weak or
nonassociated bodily experiences. Indeed, that is precisely what they
found. Gibbs concluded:
[Tihe data demonstrate how knowing something about people's
embodied experiences of hunger allows one to empirically predict which
aspects of desire will, and will not, be thought of, and talked about, in
terms of our complex embodied understandings of hunger. This
evidence is generally consistent across two different languages and
cultural communities. People use their embodied knowledge as the
primary source of metaphorical meaning and understanding. In this
way, the answer to the question "where does metaphor come from?" is
given by understanding how embodiment provides the foundation for
more abstract concepts.56
The "prediction" of which Gibbs speaks here is an experimental
prediction about what expressions will be properly motivated by our
shared embodied knowledge of hunger. He is not claiming that we can
predict which primary metaphors will exist. Rather, we can explain how
various conceptual metaphors are grounded in bodily experience and
motivated by it, and we can explain why we have the specific inferential
structure in our conception of desire that we do.
What makes the theory of primary metaphor so potentially important
is that it suggests answers to two crucial questions: (1) Why do we have
the conceptual metaphors we do? and (2) How can the meaning of

56. Id. at 10.
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abstract concepts be grounded in our bodies and our sensory-motor
experience? The answer to the first question is that we have certain
primary metaphors because of the way our brains, bodies, and environments are structured. Because of the specific kinds of cross-domain
neural connections that we acquire through our mundane, mostly
nonconscious experience, we will naturally acquire a shared set of
primary metaphors. The nature of our bodies and environments
determines precisely what those metaphors will be. This explanation
does not predict which metaphors will be activated for a particular
person and thus show up in their symbolic interaction and expression;
rather, it shows how the conceptual metaphors that we actually have in
a given culture at a given time are motivated by, and make sense
relative to, the kinds of cross-domain associations that are possible for
creatures embodied like us.
The second crucial question that the theory of primary metaphor
allows us to answer is how it might be possible for creatures embodied
in the way we are to use their embodied meaning to develop abstract
concepts and to reason with them. The key to all of this imaginative
activity is the co-activation of sensory-motor areas along with areas
thought to be responsible for so-called "higher" cognitive functions.
Primary metaphors are thus cross-domain mappings based on correlations between sensory-motor maps and structures in domains involved
in judgment and reasoning about abstract domains. In other words,
there is a directionality to the mapping-from the source domain to the
target domain-and this is instantiated in the flow of activation from a
sensory-motor area to a neural assembly responsible for what we regard
as "higher" cognitive activity.
Grady calls this second area a domain of
"subjective judgment," 7 but we really do not yet have a good account
of how to describe these neural regions. The key point is that the
inferences are actually performed in the sensory-motor areas and that
these inferences are then carried over to the target domain via the crossdomain correlations that define the primary metaphors.
VII.

METAPHORS STRUCTURING ABSTRACT CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS

Once we have primary metaphors, we are off and running, so to speak.
Through various types of blending and composition, we develop vast
coherent systems of metaphorically defined concepts. Detailed analyses
have been performed of such complex metaphorical concepts as events,
states, causes, purposes, desire, thought, mind, reason, knowledge,
values, morality, law, and politics. All of our most impressive intellectu-

57.

See generally Grady, supra note 42.
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al achievements-in physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, sociology,
mathematics, logic, philosophy, religion, and art-involve irreducible and
indispensable conceptual metaphors. In other words, all of the key
concepts in all of these disciplines are defined by multiple, often
inconsistent, retaphors, and we reason using the internal logic of those
metaphors.
I cannot survey here the evidence for the pervasiveness of conceptual
metaphor. However, there is a virtual cottage industry built around
studying the role of conceptual metaphor in every area of human
thought. Over the past twenty years, research has come up with at least
nine types of empirical evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphor
in all aspects of our symbolic expression: evidence such as polysemy
generalizations, inferential generalizations, extensions to novel cases,
sign language, gesture
studies, psychological priming experiments, and
8
discourse analysis.
The implications of the constitutive nature of conceptual metaphors
are quite far-reaching. We come to see that even our most abstract
theories are webs of body-based metaphors. This discovery does not
denigrate theory. On the contrary, it humanizes theory and shows us
why it is even possible for us to understand a theory and use it to
organize our inquiries into experience. Such analyses give us new
cognitive tools for exploring the internal logic of our conceptual systems
and theories, seeing how they are experientially grounded and tracing
out their insights and limitations. And most importantly, this view gives
us a way of understanding how embodied creatures like us can come to
think what and how we do.
This statement is obviously too abstract, so I want to offer an example
of the type of category structure I am talking about here-one drawn
from property law. I have no legal training, and I do not work in the
philosophy of law; however, I had the good fortune to work with my
colleague in the Law School, Carl Bjerre, as he was preparing a law
review article on intellectual property law.59 Here is a very small part
of what we found in our analysis of the radial category of property.
At the center of the category are prototypical instances of property,
such as a house, hand-tool, or land.6 ° These cognitive prototypes are
what are activated first for us when we read, hear, or think about the

58. For a brief survey of the types of evidence available, see LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra
note 2, at 81-86. See also GIBBS, supra note 52.
59. Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants,
Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 305 (1999).
60. Id. at 357.
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term "property.""' These prototypical instances satisfy a common
idealized cognitive model in which property is:
•a discrete physical object or spatial expanse;
•that persists through time;
•is subject to exclusion from use by others;
* is alienable;
•and is useful.2
Extending out from the central prototypes are many noncentral
members that do not possess all of the features specified by the central
idealized cognitive model. Thus water is, in American culture, though
not in certain Native American cultures, conceived of as potential
property even though it is not a discrete object. The human body is
often regarded as property, but we typically do not think of it as
alienable or transferable. Garbage is apparently regarded by the law as
property, although it seems somewhat at odds with our notion of
prototypical property because it is not typically a discrete physical object
and the notion of usefulness is suspect.6" Extending even further out
from the center are other types of property that are not physical entities.
The primary principle of extension for most of these cases is conceptual
metaphor. For example, we speak of intellectual property, such as ideas
we have that can be copyrighted, patented, and excluded from use by
others. Intellectual property is only metaphorically an entity, and it is
only metaphorically transferable to another for their use. Pensions,
stocks, and bonds are metaphorical property. We have an alleged right
to utilize such abstract, metaphorically-defined entities for our own
purposes under certain specifiable conditions. One's privacy is metaphorical property just like one's own name, and they both can become
the subject of litigation.6
In addition to metaphorical principles of extension within the category,
there are often metonymic principles coupled with the metaphors. For
example, a share of stock stands metonymically for a share of the
company, which is itself a metaphorical entity, and the company in turn
stands metonymically for the company's assets. One's name is metaphorical property, but it is also metonymic for the person named.
One could go on an on with such an analysis, but I hope that the key
points are obvious. The concept "property" is not a classical category

61.
62.
63.
64.
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See id.
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defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, the
concept is a vast, radially-structured category with a small number of
central members or prototypical cases surrounded at various distances
by noncentral members, according to principles of extension such as
conceptual metaphor and metonymy.65 Legal judgments in property
law operate relative to this complex and potentially growing conceptual
structure.
Property is at least partially a metaphorically-defined
concept.66 You cannot practice property law without metaphor!
Despite what I have argued about the central role of metaphor in
human abstract conceptualization, you may still be thinking that it is
just a figure of speech or simply an alternative way of talking, not very
important, and certainly not constitutive of our moral and legal thinking.
In response to this, I want to remind you of the critical importance of
metaphorical framing for our lives. As humans we understand things
by framing them via what George Lakoff calls "idealized cognitive
models." 7 Much of ethical and legal reasoning is a matter of framing
situations and problems relative to various cognitive models, and image
schemas, radial categories, and metaphors play a central role in defining
our models. Let me cite just two examples of this important phenomenon that exemplify the entire framing process.
I once received an email from Richard Koenigsberg, Director of the
Library of Social Science, in which he identified an overarching
metaphor that the Nazis used to frame their Final Solution, that of the
Jew as "disease within the body of the people."6
Hitler apparently
claimed that he was not one of those politicians who "doctored around
on the circumference of the distress," and he insisted on the necessity of
discovering and removing the "cause of the inflammation." 69 Koenigsberg writes:
On February 22, 1942, when the Final Solution was in full swing,
Hitler expounded his conviction that the discovery of the Jewish virus
was one of the "greatest revolutions that has taken place in the world."
The battle in which he was engaged, he said, was of the same sort as
the "battle waged by Pasteur and Koch." Himmler stated that

65.
66.
67.

See id. at 357-60.
Id.
LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 68.

68. E-mail from Richard Koenigsberg, Director, Library of Social Science, to Mark
Johnson, Knight Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy,
University of Oregon (Sept. 15, 2002, 20:06:03 EDT) (on file with author).
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Germany had the "moral right to destroy this people that wanted to
destroy us. We do not want to be infected by a bacillus and to die."70
Genocide could be justified by the need for drastic hygienic action.
Hitler argued, "One must act radically. When one pulls out a tooth one
does it with a single tug and the pain quickly goes away. The Jew must
clear out of Europe."7
Metaphorical framing is not a game. It can be a life and death matter.
Immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, many people thought
of the events as constituting a "crime." That metaphorical framing
carries with it its own specific logic. If there is a crime, then we send
the police. There are laws. There are courts to pass judgment. And
justice must be done. On the international level, this would involve
international courts and law enforcement that is subject to the
provisions of international laws and agreements. Very quickly, however,
the metaphor of "the war on terrorism" took hold and led to an entirely
different set of entailments than those defined by the "crime" framework.
If we are then engaged in war, an entirely different set of expectations,
justifications, and actions are sanctioned that are not permitted under
the "crime" metaphor. This characterization let us justify the attacks in
Afghanistan and was the basis for the Administration's decision to
invade Iraq. Based on actions taken on such metaphors, thousands of
people, including U.S. and foreign soldiers, insurgents, and many
thousands of completely innocent Iraqi citizens have died. Many more
people have been injured or maimed and now suffer horribly. The
economic, social, and political harm is incalculable. Our image in the
world has been dramatically altered. Our conception of appropriate
moral and legal action has been torn asunder.
So, we must not think of metaphor, in the old way, as a mere figure
of speech. It is a figure of life. It is a figure of thought. It is a figure
of value. We live, love, fight, and die by metaphors.

70. Id.
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